Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Bernergard, Axel ; Wärneryd, Karl
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Theorie \| mass action \| finite population games \| evolutionary stability

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 3378
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	659514915 [GVK] hdl:10419/46575 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275024