Finite-Population 'Mass-Action' and Evolutionary Stability

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Bernergard, Axel ; Warneryd, Karl
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 3378
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 17, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1788828 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316052