Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Itoh, Hideshi ; Morita, Hodaka |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Vertragstheorie | Sunk Costs | Wiederholte Spiele | Theorie | holdup problem | formal contract | relational contract | cooperative investment | fixed-price contract | relation-specific investment | repeated transactions | long-term relationships |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 3533 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 665784996 [GVK] hdl:10419/49468 [Handle] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures |
Source: |
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
Itoh, Hideshi, (2011)
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Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect
Itō, Hideshi, (2011)
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
Itoh, Hideshi, (2011)
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
Itoh, Hideshi, (2011)
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Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the holdup problem
Itoh, Hideshi, (2006)
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Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
Itoh, Hideshi, (2006)
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