Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value

We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game (N,V) satisfies that V(N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU value.

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Year of publication:	2004-01-23
Authors:	Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Shapley NTU value \| sequential formation of coalitions \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP; pages: 40; figures: Included 40 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118549