Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding - Or Somebody Else?An Experimental Investigation of Distributive Justice

This paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design:The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self-concernand the umpire modes. We study behavioral switches between self-concernand umpire mode and investigate the goodness of ten standards of behavior.In the ignorance scenario, subjects became, on average, less inequality-averseas umpires. A within{subjects analysis shows that about one half became lessinequality-averse, one quarter became more inequality-averse and one quarterremained unchanged as umpires. In the risk scenario, subjects become onaverage more inequality-averse in their umpire roles. A within-subjects analysisshows that about half became more inequality-averse, one quarter becameless inequality-averse, and one quarter remained unchanged as umpires.As to the standards of behavior, several prominent ones (leximin, leximax,Gini, Cobb-Douglas) were not supported, while expected utility, Boulding'shypothesis, the entropy social welfare function, and randomization preferenceenjoyed impressive acceptance. For the risk scenario, the tax standardof behavior joins the favorite standards of behavior.