From equilibrium models to mechanism design : On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century.

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.

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Year of publication:	2009-02
Authors:	Florenzano, Monique
Institutions:	Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Subject:	General equilibrium \| Lindahl-Foley equilibrium \| Wicksell public competitive equilibrium \| private provision equilibrium \| mechanism design \| free-rider problem \| incentive compatibility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. - ISSN 1955-611X.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	25 pages
Classification:	B20 - History of Economic Thought since 1925. General ; B21 - Microeconomics ; H10 - Structure and Scope of Government. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012508