FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM

In this paper, we prove a fuzzy version of Arrow's Theorem that contains the crisp version. We show that under our definitions, Arrow's Theorem remains intact even if levels of intensities of the players and levels of membership in the set of alternatives are considered.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	MORDESON, JOHN N. ; CLARK, TERRY D.
Published in:	New Mathematics and Natural Computation (NMNC). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-7027. - Vol. 05.2009, 02, p. 371-383
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Arrow's Theorem \| fuzzy aggregation rule \| fuzzy preference profile \| non-dictatorial \| weakly Paretian \| independent of irrelevant alternatives \| representation rules \| veto players \| oligarchies \| collegiums \| decisive sets \| filters

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980435