Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi.
Year of publication: |
2005-02
|
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Authors: | Tanguy, Solenne |
Institutions: | Maison des Sciences Économiques, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
Subject: | Unemployment insurance | monitoring | productivity | quality of jobs |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques. - ISSN 1624-0340. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 33 pages |
Classification: | J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; J68 - Public Policy |
Source: |
-
Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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-
Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation.
Tanguy, Solenne, (2004)
-
The market for job placement : a model of head-hunters.
Campens, Etienne, (2005)
-
Essai - The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance
Algan, Yann, (2006)
- More ...