Game Theory and InternationalEnvironmental Cooperation:Any Practical Application?

Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing internationalenvironmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical,abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on very specific assumptions.This article tries to qualify this critic. First, it lays out the fundamental assumptionsunderlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second itsummarizes important findings which help to explain the difficulties of cooperation anddiscusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid asymmetric welfare distributionsand to enforce an IEA. Chapter 4 discusses policy instruments in global pollution control andchapter 5 summarizes the results on the formation of coalitions. Third, the results of chapters3, 4 and 5 are critically reviewed. On the one hand, open issues with respect to the theoreticalanalysis are characterized. On the other hand, practical problems which are not covered bytheory are mentioned and evaluated as to their effect to influence policy conclusions. Fourth,the theoretical results and the derived conclusions of chapters 3 to 5 are applied to the analysisof the Kyoto-Protocol (chapter 6). The article stresses the intuition behind all results, thoughformal proofs of new results are given....