Games in Extensive Form

We introduce here extensive form games which are the most accurate way of describing a strategic situation. We show how this model finds its place in the hallmark of strategic games. We give a proof of Kuhn's fundamental theorem for games of perfect recall, that is: every mixed strategy is equivalent to a behavioral strategy. Finally, we present an equilibrium concept which fits these games: the sequential equilibrium and prove its existence.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Nomia, O.
Institutions:	Centre de recherche de mathématiques et économie mathématique (CERMSEM), Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Subject:	GAMES

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Series:	Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	15 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005630675