Generalized Contest Success Functions

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifiesthe winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume thatcontestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizationsto the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allowsus to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (1996)and Clark and Riis (1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by appliedresearchers.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-11-01
Authors:	Rai, Birendra K. ; Sarin, Rajiv
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Agency-Theorie \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion \| Nichtkooperatives Verhalten \| Rent Seeking \| rent seeking

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	379904 bytes 14 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction Jena Economic Research Papers ; 082 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Simulation methods ; Study of commerce ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866531