Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.

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Year of publication:	1999-01-27
Authors:	Haller, Hans ; Lagunoff, Roger
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	stochastic games \| Markov Perfect equilibria \| genericity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Acrobat pdf file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on Acrobat PDF Writer; pages: 25 ; figures: included. 25 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550934