Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bös, Dieter ; Lülfesmann, Christoph |
Publisher: |
Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |
Subject: | Procurement | Incomplete Contracts | Quality Choice | Governance Structure |
Series: | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 28/2001 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 86939262X [GVK] hdl:10419/78390 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:282001 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; K12 - Contract Law ; L23 - Organization of Production |
Source: |
-
Holdups, quality choice, and the Achilles' heel in government contracting
Bös, Dieter, (2001)
-
Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Bös, Dieter, (2001)
-
Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring
Naghavi, Alireza, (2009)
- More ...
-
Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Bös, Dieter, (2001)
-
The hold-up problem in government contracting
Bös, Dieter, (1994)
-
Hold-up problem in government contracting
Bös, Dieter, (1996)
- More ...