How effective is the EU's import regime for oranges?

EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by ad valorem tariffs but also by theentry price system establishing a minimum import price. In addition, the EU applies acomprehensive system of trade preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is that, in contrast toits complexity, the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to itsgoals, i.e. protecting EU producers and creating imports from preference receiving countries.The comparison of import prices for oranges from extra-EU countries with the EU entry priceshows that the former are about 40% higher than the latter on average. Also, it is pointed outthat at least 72% of extra-EU orange imports during the EU harvest season enter the EUtariff free. As a conclusion, the contribution of the import regime to the protection of EUproducers is low.Concordantly, the preferential entry price is not utilized by orange preference receivingcountries. Besides, although orange quotas increased from 1991 to 2003, actual exports fromMediterranean countries and thus quota filling rates have decreased over the same period. Itis shown that EU trade preferences for oranges were not decisive for the development ofMediterranean countries' orange exports to the EU. In the light of the low effectiveness of theentry price system for oranges along with high transaction costs involved, its abolishmentshould be considered. Yet, results cannot be generalized, even not for citrus fruit, as isdemonstrated for mandarins.