How moral codes evolve in a trust game

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has unstable oscillations around an interior Nash Equilibrium (NE), but under smoothed best response dynamics we obtain convergence to Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE).

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Rabanal, Jean Paul ; Friedman, Daniel
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 6.2015, 2, p. 150-160
Publisher:	Basel : MDPI
Subject:	Prisoner's Dilemma \| evolutionary stability \| moral codes

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g6020150 [DOI] 834216760 [GVK] hdl:10419/167938 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709844