Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

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Year of publication:	2008-10-01
Authors:	Shneyerov, Art ; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
Institutions:	Vancouver School of Economics
Subject:	auctions \| identification

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.ca working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	13 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977026