Identification of First-Price Auctions with Biased Beliefs

This paper exploits variation in the number of bidders to separately identify the valuation distribution and the bidders' belief about the valuation distribution in first-price auctions with independent private values. Exploiting variation in auction volume the result is extended to environments with risk averse bidders. In an illustrative application we fail to reject the null hypothesis of correct beliefs

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Grundl, Serafin
Other Persons:	Zhu, Yu (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Erwartungsbildung \| Expectation formation \| Systematischer Fehler \| Bias

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
Series:	http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.056
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 14, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2638360 [DOI]
Classification:	c57 ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018386