Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Erkut, Hande ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Sefton, Martin
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 130.2015, C, p. 28-31
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Social norms \| Dictator games \| Norm elicitation

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263441