Imitation, local interaction, and efficiency: reappraisal

We revisit the model of Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria, and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Chen, Hsiao-Chi ; Chow, Yunshyong ; Wu, Li-Chau
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 675-684
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Coordination game \| imitation \| local interaction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D0 - Microeconomics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649705