Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection.

This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementaion models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Arya, A. ; Glover, J. ; Rajan, U.
Institutions:	Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
Subject:	ADVERSE SELECTION \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	GSIA Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	28 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968788