Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms

In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for implementation under various informational structures are provided.

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Year of publication:	1998-07-03
Authors:	Brusco, Sandro
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 3.1998, 3, p. 271-300
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 6 April 1996 / Accepted: 19 April 1998
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370588