Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Catenaro, Marco ; Vidal, Jean-Pierre
Publisher:	Frankfurt a. M. : European Central Bank (ECB)
Subject:	International Fiscal Issues \| Policy Co-ordination

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Series:	ECB Working Paper ; 259
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/152693 [Handle] RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20030259 [RePEc]
Classification:	E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604305