(In)efficient repo markets

Tobias Dieler, Loriano Mancini, Norman Schürhoff

Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and non-anonymous over-the-counter (OTC) markets, are inefficient and their welfare rankings depend on funding tightness. CCP (OTC) markets inefficiently liquidate high (low) quality assets for large (small) funding shocks. Two innovations to repo market design contribute to maximize welfare: a liquidity-contingent trading mechanism and a two-tiered guarantee fund

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Alternative title:	Inefficient repo markets
Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Dieler, Tobias ; Mancini, Loriano ; Schürhoff, Norman
Publisher:	Geneva : Swiss Finance Institute
Subject:	repo market \| funding run \| nancial stability \| asymmetric information \| central clearing \| novation \| guarantee fund \| collateral \| Repo-Geschäft \| Repo transactions \| Kreditsicherung \| Collateral \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Investmentfonds \| Investment Fund \| Finanzkrise \| Financial crisis \| Theorie \| Theory \| Clearing \| Financial clearing

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute. - Geneva, ZDB-ID 2392286-2. - Vol. no 21, 10
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3779987 [DOI]
Classification:	G01 - Financial Crises ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012487590