Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability : New Results and Classic Applications

This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Mailath, George J.
Other Persons:	Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von (contributor)
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148, No. 5, 2013 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 10, 1012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1683471 [DOI]
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976363