Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction

Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Mohit et al. (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be LOBIC with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set (TS) correlation. In this paper, we provide a counter example to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition for the same in terms of sequential ordinal nondomination.

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Bose, Abhigyan ; Roy, Souvik
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 17.2022, 2, p. 929-942
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility \| correlated beliefs \| sequential ordinal nondomination property

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4495 [DOI] hdl:10419/296374 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:4495 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536916