Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Loginova, Oksana ; Wang, Xinghe Henry ; Lu, Haibin
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Unternehmensnetzwerk \| Business network

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2009 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 31, 2008 erstellt
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194982