Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée ; Triossi, Matteo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Ehe \| Marriage \| Theorie \| Theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Familienökonomik \| Family economics \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 10, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3405698 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D62 - Externalities ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105711