Incentives, Communication, and Payment Instruments

Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment. Attention is restricted to checks and bank drafts, which differ in resource cost and communication characteristics. Checks are less costly but settlement delays create a limited commitment constraint. We find that drafts dominate at low wealths and checks at higher wealths. Applications to 19th century and modern payment systems are discussed

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Prescott, Edward S.
Other Persons:	Weinberg, John A. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Zahlungsverkehr \| Payment system \| Scheck \| Cheque

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Series:	FRB Richmond Working Paper ; No. 00-11
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 30, 2000 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2126797 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102303