Inequality and Team Performance

We investigate the effects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute to a public good or a team output when agents are inequity averse. We show that inequality may increase total output when it favors the more able agents. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the larger should be the inequality in wealth if total output is to be maximized.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Kölle, Felix ; Sliwka, Dirk ; Zhou, Nannan
Publisher:	Frankfurt a. M. : Verein für Socialpolitik
Subject:	Public good \| team incentives \| inequity aversion \| inequality \| wage setting

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Series:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams ; F12-V2
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Conference Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	654888140 [GVK] hdl:10419/37514 [Handle]
Classification:	M50 - Personnel Economics. General ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; D31 - Personal Income, Wealth and Their Distributions
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270183