Inequity Aversion in Tournaments

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly.

Year of publication:	2003-04-01
Authors:	Demougin, Dominique ; Fluet, Claude
Publisher:	Universität <Berlin, Humboldt-Universität> / Institut für Organisationstheorie
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Wettkampf \| Tournaments \| Lohndifferenzierung \| Neid \| envy

Extent:	361472 bytes 25 p. application/pdf
Series:	Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät - Walther Rathenau Institut für Organisationstheorie - Dominique Demougin's Papers auch: Cahier de recherche/Working Paper ; 03-22
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J4 - Particular Labor Markets ; Theory of organisation ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844239