Information and targeted spending

Jon X. Eguia, Antonio Nicolo

We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Eguia, Jon X. ; Nicolò, Antonio
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : Wiley, ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 14.2019, 2, p. 373-402
Subject:	Local public goods \| information \| elections \| targeted spending \| Lokale öffentliche Güter \| Öffentliche Ausgaben \| Public expenditure \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE2508 [DOI] hdl:10419/217067 [Handle]
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022729