Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

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Year of publication:	2008-01
Authors:	Ostrovsky, Michael ; Schwarz, Michael
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	NBER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	ED LS published as Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May. Number 13766
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; I2 - Education ; J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710586