Information in Conflicts

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

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Year of publication:	2000-06-19
Authors:	Wärneryd, Karl
Institutions:	Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
Subject:	Conflict \| contest \| asymmetric information \| all-pay auction

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Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, pages 121-136. The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 388 17 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649250