Information in conflicts

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

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Alternative title:	Information in Konflikten
Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Wärneryd, Karl
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Subject:	Conflict \| contest \| asymmetric information \| all-pay auction

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; FS IV 01-11
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/51107 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:FSIV0111 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307000