Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
Year of publication: |
September 2015
|
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Authors: | Wagner, Christoph ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy ; Tröger, Thomas |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 280-289
|
Subject: | Information rents | Informed principal | Mechanism design | Moral hazard | Signaling | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Signalling |
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