Institutional Changes and Discretionary Value for Property Rights in Drylands’ Farming of the Sudan

Research on land tenure and use control and the socioeconomic sets of regulations in the agricultural rainfed sub sector of Sudan, come to focus for many reasons. Anthropogenic pressure, expanding animal population and migration led to accelerated impacts on both the ecological systems and land yields. Conflicts between governmental regulations and indigenous rules contribute to generate inconsistencies on who have the right to till the land and hence own it. With such transformation logically, more intensive commercial farming took place and land intake exponentially increased. Private or collective property rights of land are procured through traditional tenure, prescription, settlement or tribal entitlement. However, formally, the majority of the land in Sudan rightly belongs to the state. Eventually, we can expect an institutional conflict with current socioeconomic transformations and the legalism of present rights. We cite El Tigani Mustafa Mohamed (1999) that traditional land tenure and the emerging institutional transformations have both contributed to social changes in the Darfur societies. Consequently there were definite struggle on property rights and hence on land. Economic interpreted, we can postulate that: increasing economic scarcity of land calls forth a demand for individually secure rights which guarantee that individuals will fully recoup the benefits of newly profitable, long-lived fixed investment in land. The Evolutionary Theory of land rights, which depends on laws of scarcity. However, with the exception of Besley (1995) the existing literature is infinitesimal about the development of marketability rights, as distinct from secure private use rights. Yet the distinction between tenure security and land marketability rights has important implications for the economics of how such institutional changes develop. For land markets to operate and for marketability rights to be valued, the individuals who constitute the economy must be heterogeneous. Thus, at a single market price there are both willing sellers and willing buyers