Institutions, holdup and automation

Giorgio Presidente

This paper documents a positive relationship between labor-friendly institutions and investment in industrial robots in a sample of advanced economies. Institutions explain a substantial proportion of cross-country variation in automation. The relationship between institutions and robots is stronger in sunk cost-intensive industries, where producers are more vulnerable to holdup. This suggests that automation is used by producers as a tool to thwart rent appropriation by labor.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Presidente, Giorgio
Publisher:	Munich, Germany : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
Subject:	automation \| robots \| holdup \| institutions \| unions \| sunk costs \| appropriability \| bargaining \| frictions \| rents \| technology adoption \| Automatisierung \| Automation \| Sunk Costs \| Sunk costs \| Roboter \| Robot \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Technischer Fortschritt \| Technological change

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.cesifo.org

hdl.handle.net

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. no. 7834 (September 2019)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/207225 [Handle]
Classification:	O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; O43 - Institutions and Growth ; O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103580