Internal and external political competition

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, andfrom other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competitionare substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowingthem to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers’ incentives to invest.External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration.[...]

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Hugh-Jones, David
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| market microstructure \| Politik \| Diktatur \| Transitionssystem \| transition \| Demokratie

Table of Contents
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1. INTRODUCTION
2. LITERATURE
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION
4. EVIDENCE
5. CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
REFERENCES

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