Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competitionon a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and imple-menting tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higherincentive intensity, higher efforts and output levels but lower profits.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Pull, Kerstin ; Stadler, Manfred
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Agency-Theorie \| Experimentelle Spieltheorie \| Experimental Economics \| Interner Wettbewerb \| tournament fever

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Extent:	335872 bytes 9 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Insitut für Ökonomik - Papaers on Strategic Interaction JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS ; 007 (2009)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1864-7057
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Personnel psychology ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866426