Job Assignments under Moral Hazard:The Peter Principle Revisited

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...

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Year of publication:	2007-08-01
Authors:	Koch, Alexander Karl ; Nafziger, Julia
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Information \| information

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Extent:	367616 bytes 30 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 2973 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M12 - Personnel Management ; Personnel management, Personnel planning and Personnel development ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862318