Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as one side (North Korea) overleverages its position, while the other side makes unproductive compromises.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Alexandru, Georgescu
Published in:	Revista OEconomica. - Societatea Romana de Economie - SOREC. - 2011, 04
Publisher:	Societatea Romana de Economie - SOREC
Subject:	United States \| North Korea \| Kim Jong-il \| Theory of Moves \| Nash equilibrium \| six party talks \| cycle of aggression \| information and power asymmetry \| regressive induction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions ; F52 - National Security; Economic Nationalism ; F54 - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism ; F55 - International Institutional Arrangements ; N4 - Government, War, Law, and Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965563