L’information diffusée par l’exploitant sur le risque nucléaire : quelle réponse aux attentes des parties prenantes ?

The objective of this research is to know if there are distances between the expectations of the stakeholders and the information disclosed by the firm on the nuclear risk in its annual report. First of all, I wonder about the motives which lead companies to disclose environmental information, by associating the theories of the legitimacy and the stakeholders. I notice then the report which the financial accounting does not allow to report the whole nuclear risk. In particular, accounting (provision and contingent liability) does not integrate the risks of uncertain occurrence with important possible damages, as the risk of nuclear accident. Consequently, this research widens the field of analysis beyond financial status to contain all the information disclosed by the firm in its annual report. I determine the expectations of the stakeholders in information on the nuclear risk, then confront these expectations with the information disclosed by the firms in their annual report. Two additional measures allow me to analyze this information. The first one which describes the information indicates that only 7% of the disclosed information about the nuclear risk in annual reports is quantitative visible information for the reader and dealing with precise objectives or with concrete programs led by the firms. The second measure deals with the quality of the information. It suggests that a lot of information wished by the stakeholders is not disclosed. All in all, the expectations of the regulating, financial and media stakeholders seem satisfied but those of the stakeholders of the environmental lobby groups would not be.