Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude becomes decisive and firms’ managers have to be able to interpret or even anticipate this attitude.

MoreLess

Authors:	Dittrich, Dennis ; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung für Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Experiment \| Experiments \| Aversion \| Spieltheorie \| game theory

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

1 Introduction
2 Theory
2.1 The Bilateral Gift Exchange Game
2.2 Theoretical Predictions
3 Motivation and Hypotheses
3.1 Research Hypotheses
4 Experimental design and practical procedures
4.1 Experimental design
4.2 Practical procedures
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Employees wage-effort schedule
5.2 Managers wage-setting behavior
6 Conclusion

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697