Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics : toward pure managerial firms?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Hilli, Amal ; Laussel, Didier ; Long, Ngo Van |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 37.2013, 3, p. 666-679
|
Subject: | Ownership dynamics | Managerial firms | Theorie | Theory | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Management | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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