Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members

Vera Angelova, Werner Güth, Martin G. Kocher

We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.

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Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Angelova, Vera ; Güth, Werner ; Kocher, Martin
Publisher:	Munich, Germany : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190
Subject:	Cooperation \| leadership \| social dilemma \| public goods provision \| experiment \| Experiment \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kooperation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion paper. - München : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, ZDB-ID 2881680-8. - Vol. no. 202 (November 27, 2019)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/222099 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D64 - Altruism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126333