Leading with(out) sacrifice? : a public-goods experiment with a super-additive player

Andreas Glöckner; Bernd Irlenbusch; Sebastian Kube; Andreas Nicklisch; Hans-Theo Normann

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player. -- Experiments ; Leadership ; Reciprocity ; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

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Year of publication:	Mar. 2009
Authors:	Glöckner, Andreas ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Kube, Sebastian
Other Persons:	Nicklisch, Andreas (contributor) ; Normann, Hans-Theo (contributor)
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Führungspersönlichkeit \| Leadership personality \| Austauschtheorie \| Social exchange theory \| Experiment

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (10 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2172002-2. - Vol. 2009,8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/32201 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862276