Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Saglam, Ismail ; Koray, Semih
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 12, p. 1-10
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110586