Learning in Bayesian Regulation

We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.

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Year of publication:	2005-04
Authors:	Koray, Semih ; Saglam, Ismail

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (2005): Learning in Bayesian Regulation.
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015219282