Lectures on Political Competition and Welfare

There are N citizens who have to make a social decision about a set policies denotedby x ∈ A, where A denotes the set of feasible policies. Citizen’s preferencesover policy are denoted V i (x, j) ( where i = 1, ...,N) ,and j denotes the identityof the policy maker. This specification allows for the many other possibilities beyondpurely self-interested policy making. For example, citizens may be altruisticor paternalistic. Individuals may also care about who holds office. One extremepossibility is that individuals care only about holding office. However, they couldalso care intrinsically about selecting a particular citizen to make policy on theirbehalf.Feasibility is also defined broadly. Naturally, it includes technological feasibilityas a constraint. However, it may also embody constraints on informationavailable to the policy maker. It may also embody constitutional restrictions onpolicy instruments if these are relevant. The following gives a few examples thatillustrate policy making environments that fit the model.[...]