Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing withunionized labor market

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

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Year of publication:	2007-05-01
Authors:	Mukherjee, Arijit
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Gewerkschaft \| trade union \| Lizenzvergabe \| Gebühr \| Fees \| Lizenzgebühr \| Royalty

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Extent:	128000 bytes 21 p. application/pdf
Series:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 07/03
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues ; Strategic planning ; Specific management methods ; Product policy ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868601